The solid victory of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party in Armenia’s recent parliamentary elections has left observers with many questions. How did Pashinyan manage to win again after Armenia’s crushing defeat in the war with Azerbaijan and the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, which caused deep disappointment and polarization in Armenian society? And why did the Kremlin’s political machinations, which intimidate even advanced democracies, fail to work in a country with nascent institutions, where Moscow retains powerful levers of influence?

According to the election results, Pashinyan’s party won a convincing 49.7 percent of the vote, with its share reaching as high as 60 percent in rural areas. Strong Armenia, led by the pro-Russian oligarch Samvel Karapetyan (23.3 percent), and the Armenia Alliance led by former president Robert Kocharyan (9.9 percent) also cleared the 4 percent threshold for parliamentary representation. 

What’s striking about the results is that the pro-European party gained more votes in the provinces, while pro-Russian nationalists performed better in large cities. This paradox might have been due to Armenians with dual Russian citizenship visiting to vote for Karapetyan (voter turnout was a full 10 percent higher than usual), but there are other persuasive explanations.

One is that a pro-Pashinyan “silent majority” has formed in regions that benefited from infrastructure projects after the 2018 Velvet Revolution and border villages grateful for the winding down of the armed conflict with Azerbaijan. The silent majority was willing to do anything to prevent the pre-revolutionary “old guard” and their pro-Russian networks from returning to power. Joined by supporters of EU integration and those annoyed by Kremlin interference, they made waves in the parliamentary election.

In large cities, on the other hand, a vocal segment of the Armenian middle class and intelligentsia— who one might think would be EU integration’s biggest supporters—remain unable to forgive Pashinyan for the loss of Karabakh and for abandoning the pursuit of international recognition of the Armenian genocide.

Most likely, Moscow’s threats of a trade war and import bans on Armenian products were meant to scare the silent majority away from supporting Pashinyan. However, the measures appear to have backfired. Armenian society cannot forgive Russia—its official Collective Security Treaty Organization ally—for abandoning Armenia just when it most needed its assistance during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War with Azerbaijan in 2020, which ended in Armenia’s defeat and the subsequent flight of ethnic Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh. Indeed, Russian officials’ justification for the import ban (“phytosanitary standards”) seemed so mocking that it spurred even some of Pashinyan’s critics to vote for him.

Nevertheless, pro-Russian parties hardly performed poorly. They owe their parliamentary gains to the segment of Armenian society that’s still willing to believe Moscow and blames Pashinyan for the loss of Karabakh.

Support from the West also helped counter Russian pressure. For all their disagreements, Washington and Brussels are on the same page with regard to Armenia. In a Truth Social post, U.S. President Donald Trump expressed support for Pashinyan and called for “Making Armenia Great Again.” A few days before the election, Secretary of State Marco Rubio flew to Yerevan and, without leaving the airport, signed several agreements with his Armenian counterpart regarding the implementation of the TRIPP transit route and rare earth metals.

The Europeans offered even greater support. The May summit of the European Political Community in Yerevan was unprecedented in terms of the number of high-ranking guests. Nor was it all for show. The EU allocated grants to Armenia for various EU integration programs, sent a “partnership mission” to counter hybrid threats, provided financial assistance, and temporarily opened its market to Armenian products barred from Russian markets.

The neutrality of Armenia’s neighbors also alleviated some of the pressure. Despite their ties to Moscow and strained relations with the West, Georgia and Iran reacted calmly to Pashinyan’s victory.

There were greater concerns over Azerbaijan and Turkey. Armenians’ distrust of these countries risks undermining Pashinyan’s biggest projects: the peace agenda and open borders. Many in Armenia do not believe long-term peace with Azerbaijan and Turkey is possible and view these neighbors as an existential threat—a sentiment that the pro-Russian opposition actively exploited. Armenia’s pre-election infospace was haunted by the claim that if Pashinyan won, 300,000 Azerbaijanis would move to Armenia—despite the 2025 Washington Agreement having settled the issue of returning Azerbaijanis.

Under such circumstances, any actions or even statements from Baku or Ankara that could be interpreted as confirming the fears of Armenian society could have brought Pashinyan’s approval ratings crashing down. This is precisely why Azerbaijan and Turkey’s “benevolent neutrality” proved so important.

True, at the beginning of the year, many in Yerevan expected more from both Baku and, especially, Ankara. Some hoped that the Armenian–Turkish border would be opened to third-country nationals before the elections, a move that has been discussed for several years. However, Ankara decided to follow Azerbaijan’s lead, and Baku preferred to wait until the election results were in.

At the very least, both countries refrained from aggressive rhetoric. Various cargoes continued to flow into Armenia via Azerbaijani territory, and Ankara allowed Armenia to use the Gyumri–Akhalqalaki–Kars railway, essentially linking the country to Europe by rail. The conflict persists, in some ways: The destruction of the Cathedral of the Holy Mother of God in Nagorno-Karabakh in late April is proof. However, the situation as a whole remains stable.

The road ahead remains rocky for Pashinyan. He secured the silent majority’s support but lost part of the middle class, while his political enemies are emboldened. The pro-Russian opposition, with its new seats in parliament, is bound to create problems for Pashinyan. His personal feud with Kocharyan and his equally toxic rivalry with Karapetyan will add fuel to the fire.

Pashinyan’s victory was decisive, but not a landslide. It’s enough to form a single-party government and pass laws independently, but not enough to secure a constitutional majority—which could cause problems in the peace process with Azerbaijan. Baku is currently insisting that before a peace treaty can be signed, Armenia must amend its constitution to remove indirect references to Nargorno-Karabakh: something that would require a referendum. It’s also possible that the parties will find other ways to make progress—like signing but not ratifying a treaty or opening Armenia’s borders without one.

The pro-Russian opposition won’t be able to halt the peace process, but it could slow down Armenia’s rapprochement with the EU. Its strong showing in the parliamentary election could also give Moscow the impression that Pashinyan is less secure than he seems, motivating it to ramp up hybrid pressure on Yerevan.

Still, Armenia’s rapprochement with the West will persist—as will the cycle of tension and normalization in its relations with Russia. Pashinyan has already announced an upcoming visit to Moscow, while Russia has banned even more Armenian imports. Yet increasing the pressure too far now that the election is over could backfire for Russia, jeopardizing its remaining assets in Armenia, from companies such as Gazprom Armenia and South Caucasus Railways to the military base at Gyumri.